The empirics of economic geography: How to draw policy implications? by Combes, Pierre-Philippe
The empirics of economic geography: How to draw
policy implications?
Pierre-Philippe Combes
To cite this version:
Pierre-Philippe Combes. The empirics of economic geography: How to draw policy implica-
tions?. 2010. <halshs-00536078>
HAL Id: halshs-00536078
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00536078
Submitted on 15 Nov 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III
Document de Travail 
         n°2010-41 
 
 
 
THE EMPIRICS OF ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY: 
HOW TO DRAW POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pierre-Philippe COMBES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The empirics of economic geography:
How to draw policy implications?
Pierre-Philippe Combes∗†
Greqam, Aix-Marseille University
October 2010
Abstract: Using both reduced-form and structural approaches, the spectrum of
policy recommendations that can be drawn from empirical economic geography is
pretty large. Reduced-form approaches allow the researchers to consider many vari-
ables that impact on regional disparities, as long as they are careful about interpretation
and endogeneity issues. Structural approaches have the opposite advantages. Less
issues can be simultaneously addressed, but one can be more precise in terms of which
intuitions are considered and the underlying mechanisms and effects at work. Many
regional policy issues remain unanswered, opening some interesting future lines of
research.
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1. Introduction
In their book, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) called for the emergence of empirical con-
tributions to assess the relevance of new economic geography models. Ten years later, quite
a few papers have shown that such models are not rejected by the real data. Moreover, these
papers emphasise the role of certain variables, such as the real market potential, that are extremely
relevant empirically to explain regional development. Beyond such conclusions, we try here to
assess the policy implications to be drawn from this empirical material, the limits to such exercises
and the directions research could take to better enlighten the regional policy debate.
We start by describing an empirical literature whose roots are older than new economic geo-
graphy models, but which has benefited from renewed interest with this emphasis on the need for
empirical assessment of regional development models. Typically, this literature seeks to determine
which characteristics of a region enhance its productivity or growth. We show that advances in
econometric methods and the availability of individual data sets has allowed significant progress
in the precision and robustness of conclusions, and therefore on the policy implications that can be
drawn. We then review the more structural empirical literature, sticking closely to new economic
geography models, and we illustrate how it can be used to derive relevant policy implications. In
both cases, we conclude that empirical studies specifically designed to deal with policy issues are
still the exception and we propose possible lines of research in such a direction.
2. Reduced-form approaches and the optimal characteristics of regions
In recent years, interest in the empirical evaluation of new economic geography models has in turn
revived interest in the literature estimating the magnitude of agglomeration economies, which is
older and with fairly different theoretical roots. To assess the empirical relevance of these reduced-
form approaches, we first describe their theoretical background, define the empirical assumptions
and how they are dealt with. Then we move to possible policy implications of the results obtained
and to possible extensions that would enlarge the policy scope of such approaches. This concerns
the existence of an optimal size, and more generally industrial composition, of regions, the links
between trade and regional disparities, and the possible role of regional subsidies.
21 Theoretical background and estimation strategies
Maybe even more than in other fields, reduced-form empirical approaches in economic geography
need to have their theoretical background clarified. Otherwise, it is very difficult to interpret the
results obtained and to assess whether missing variables or endogeneity issues arise. The literature
we review in this section fits into the following very simple framework. This is not really a model,
but it sheds light on the relationship between productivity and the industrial characteristics of
the region of interest. It assumes that a firm j operates under constant marginal cost in region r
and industry s. Its output yj depends, on the one hand, on the capital k j and labour lj it uses,
along with its level of technology Aj and average labour efficiency sj, and, on the other hand, on
intermediate consumptions, cj, which are made explicit here to match the data that usually concern
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value-added. The production function is assumed to be given by
yj = Min
(
Ajkαj
(
sjlj
)1−α ,cj
β
)
,
where α ∈ ]0,1[ and β > 0 are two technological parameters. Firm j’s profit can be written as:
pij =∑
b
pjbyjb − vjcj − wjlj − rjk j,
where yjb is the quantity exported to area b and pjb is the price set for region b, net of trade costs (if
any) borne by the firm. vj is the marginal cost of intermediate consumption, wj is the wage and rj
is the cost of other inputs. Firm j’s profit reduces to:
pij = pjyj − wjlj − rjk j,
where pj = ∑b pjb
yjb
yj
− βvj is the average income per unit produced by the firm, net of trade
and intermediate consumption costs. With such a specification, pjyj represents value-added, the
magnitude usually provided in data sets. The first-order conditions for profit maximisation under
perfect competition on both goods and inputs markets reduces to
wj = (1− α) (α)α/(1−α) sj
(
pj Aj
rαj
)1/(1−α)
, (1)
which serves as the basis for the estimation. Alternatively, one can work on total factor productiv-
ity, which is given by
pjyj
kαj l
1−α
j
= pj Ajs1−αj (2)
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to summarise most economic geography effects. Typically,
productivity (wages or total factor productivity) is high in a region if the region benefits from
technology or labour efficiency pure externalities that make Aj or sj high. But wage and total
factor productivity are also high if market access is good relatively to the degree of competition,
which translates into high prices net of trade costs, pj. Finally, firm j may also benefit from Mar-
shallian externalities working through local input markets. If the access to inputs (or intermediate
consumption) is good, translating into low rj (or vj), then wages and total factor productivity
are also high. All these effects can be read in the reverse direction. Productivity is low if pure
congestion effects dominate in the region, which lowers Aj or sj, if market access is bad - either
because competition is strong or because markets are located far away (which implies a low pj) -
or if access to inputs is bad (high rj or vj, due to high land prices for example).
Economic geography models are much richer than the present framework. They provide
micro-foundations to all market-based effects, typically working through pj and rj in fully-fledged
models under imperfect competition and equilibrium as general as possible. To ground theoret-
ically reduced-form approaches in economic geography, there is no need to go much further than
that, however. Taking the example of the impact of density on productivity, the following wage
equation is typically estimated
ln wrs = a + β ln denr + εrs, (3)
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where wrs is the average wage in region r and sector s, denr = empr/supr corresponds to the total
number of employees (or population) in region r (empr) divided by land area (supr) and εrs is
an error term representing unexplained productivity. Typical values for elasticity β are between
0.02 and 0.09. When density is doubled, wages increase by
(
2β − 1)× 100, i.e., between 2 and 7%
according to standard estimates. Density gaps between regions at the first and third quartile can
be as high as a factor of 15, even within the same country, in which case the productivity gap is
higher than 50%.
A value-added / total factor productivity equation can also be estimated, generally extended to
a framework that does not assume a constant marginal cost, typically
ln prsyrs = αs ln krs + α′s ln lrs + β ln denr + εrs
Relating these specifications to the theoretical framework implies that the assumption made is
log
sj
(
pj Aj
rαj
)1/(1−α)(r,s) = β ln denr + εrs
or
log
[
s1−αj
(
pj Aj
)(r,s)]
= β ln denr + εrs,
the left-hand-side of these equations corresponding to logarithm of the average over all firms
located in region r and operating in sector s. Hence, the impact of density on productivity
works through either Aj, sj, pj, or rj, which means that the channel of agglomeration economies
(technology, labour efficiency, goods or inputs prices) is not identified. Second, only the total net
effect of density is identified, negative effects being possibly offset by positive effects, and vice versa
Still, and as described below, the impact of density increases on productivity can be crucial from the
policy point of view, making such estimations important.
Whereas local productivity is usually explained at the industrial level, s, density is not an
industry-specific variable. It reflects what are called "inter-industry"’ (or "urbanisation") extern-
alities, which are the effects of the overall characteristics of the region that do not depend on
s. Other proxies for inter-industry externalities that are normally included in such regressions
are the overall size (land-area or total employment) of the local economy and local industrial
diversity, which measures the role of the distribution of activity across local industries, typically
using a Herfindhal index on local industrial shares. Recently, in relation to those more structural
studies presented in section 3 below, a simple market potential variable has often been introduced
to measure the role of the proximity to dense markets other than the local one. Typically, Harris’
(1954) potential given by
MPr = ln∑
u 6=r
denu
dru
where dru is the distance between r and u, is often used. This is an external market potential,
own-region density not being included since its effect is evaluated separately.
The second important question this literature tackles relates to the role of local industry char-
acteristics. This concerns externalities operating within the industry, called "intra-industry" (or
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"localisation") externalities. The most standard intra-industry externalities proxy is the degree of
specialisation of the region in the industry, measured by its share in the local economy. The average
size of firms, which can capture the magnitude of intra-firm economies of scale, is also sometimes
considered Finally, the share of professionals in the local labour force of the industry evaluates the
possible role that such workers can play as a conduit of technological spillovers.1
There is another reason to control, more generally, for the skills composition of the labour force.
In local productivity, it is important to isolate those effects that really result from local externalities
from more direct differences in labour efficiency across occupations. Not properly controlling for
the uneven spatial distribution of occupations, some regions could appear more productive even
if there is no local externality, simply due to the fact that they host more skilled people. While it is
interesting to understand why the distribution of skills is uneven, a question to which we return
below, the literature proposes strategies to quantify the presence of local externalities separately
from this composition effect of local labour markets.
Finally, this literature acknowledges the fact that local endowments, in a broad sense, do differ
across regions, which affects productivity, again possibly independently from the presence of
agglomeration economies. Typically, one would like to control for private and public capital local
endowments (research centres, universities, transport infrastructure), physical geography (access
to coast, river, central location, etc.) and for the quality of local institutions or the level of available
technology, these last two being more relevant in the context of developing countries (including
China).
Clarifying the theoretical framework as we have just done is important for an accurate interpret-
ation of the results. It is also necessary to assess whether econometric estimates may suffer from
endogeneity biases. Typically, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates assume that no explanatory
variable is correlated with the residuals. In equation (3), this means that the co-variance between
density and the residual is zero. There are two sources of endogeneity, missing variables and
reverse causality, which we illustrate here in the case of density but which concern almost all the
variables that this literature considers.
Possible missing variables are numerous. Some industries are more productive than others at
the national level and simultaneously over-represented in the densest areas. This is also the case of
the local endowments that increase productivity. If such variables are omitted from the regression,
the effect of the density, interpreted as a presence of local externalities, is over-estimated, since it
captures effects not directly reflecting agglomeration economies. Density economies can also be
under-estimated if one omits from the regression local amenities (cultural goods, leisure facilities,
etc.) that are also positively correlated with density. Indeed, Roback (1982) underlines that
amenities attract people to cities, thereby increasing land prices, encouraging firms to substitute
labour for land in the production process, thus reducing the marginal productivity of labour.
Reverse causality arises when people and/or firms choose their location according to their
returns, directly linked to the local productivity. In this case, productivity shocks unobserved by
the econometrician (e.g., local government choosing an efficient policy, a climate event decreasing
1See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a review.
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efficiency) but observed by people and/or firms become correlated to density due to endogenous
location choices, thus biasing OLS estimates.
Fortunately, both sources of bias can be circumvented. One strategy consists in introducing all
available control variables, as long as they are consistent with the theoretical framework. If panel
data are available, fixed-effect strategies can be adopted, for instance to control for aggregate effects
such as the nation-wide industry-specific ones. Fixed-effects, in this case individual, can also be
used to address the role of individual skills, as proposed by Combes, Duranton and Gobillon
(2008). The second strategy relies on instrumentation. The aim is to find instrumental variables
correlated with the possibly endogenous explanatory variables, typically density, but not with
productivity shocks. One then replaces the endogenous explanatory variables in the regression
by their predictor according to the instruments. As proposed for instance by Ciccone and Hall
(1992), the literature typically uses historical variables, for instance local density many decades
before the years for which the model is estimated. Combes, Duranton, Gobillon and Roux (2009)
also propose using instruments based on the nature of soils, which could be a determinant of very
early human settlements. Because of the inertia of location patterns, both families of instruments
remain correlated to current density, whereas they have little chance of being correlated with
current productivity shocks. Finally, natural experiments that affect density or market-potential
exogenously can be also used to identify their causal effect on productivity. For instance, Hanson
(1996, 1997) uses Mexico’s trade liberalisation, Redding and Strum (2008) use the division of
Germany after the Second World War, although in a more structural context than those presented in
section 3. Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2011) detail all these issues related to the identification
of agglomeration economies. Finally, instead of assessing the impact of local characteristics on
productivity, an older literature studies the possible dynamic effects of these characteristics, i.e.,
their impact on local growth. This approach is described in Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008).
However, studying its policy implications, which are furthermore blurred by the weak links with
theory, is beyond the scope of this paper.
22 Policy implications
We now turn to the possible policy implications that can be drawn from reduced-form estimations.
Although some clear messages are sometimes obtained, the absence of a real objective to provide
policy recommendations in this literature is striking. This is underlined by both the lack of policy-
oriented interpretation of existing results towards this line and the partial inappropriateness of the
strategy used.
22.1 How to gain more from density?
Clearly, the main outcome of this literature consists in the characterisation of the optimal charac-
teristics of the regions, in terms of both overall size and industrial composition. For instance, the
positive effect of density on productivity that is always obtained in such estimations clearly implies
that increasing the size of regions induces productivity gains. It is, however, difficult to evaluate
the magnitude of these gains precisely. For a country like France, a doubling of density leads to
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a productivity gain of 2% at the lower bound, but almost 5% at the upper bound, depending on
the controls introduced and, more importantly, on whether the endogenous quality (skills) and
quantity (number) of the labour force are controlled for. Typically, controlling for the endogeneity
of density reduces its impact by 20%, while taking individual skills properly into account divides
the estimation of agglomeration economies by a factor of 2. This makes quite a large difference
for the policy-maker thinking about improving the productivity of local firms and workers by
increasing density.
Such differences in estimates are partly related to an interpretational issue that is rarely com-
mented. The 2% obtained for France corresponds to the density elasticity controlled for both
skills and endogeneity. Doubling employment density increases the productivity of any worker
by 2% independently of the composition of the labour force (but keeping the industrial structure
constant). Now, on aggregate grounds, when one doubles the density in a region, one can simul-
taneously match the current regional skills composition, and the gain is 2% for all workers in the
region. But one can also match the skill composition of the regions that are twice as large, biased
towards higher skills. In this case, one must consider the total effect of density, i.e., not only the
2% corresponding to the direct effect, but also the extra gains due to the presence of more skilled
workers, resulting in a total increase in regional average productivity of around 4%. Since density
is endogenous, the policymaker can also expect increased productivity to attract even more people
to the region. This will have a positive feed-back effect on productivity, which will increase by a
further 1% point, hence the total 5% effect mentioned above.
This discussion raises a second issue about how a policy-maker can increase the size of a region.
The comparative static exercise we have just described corresponds to the compulsory displace-
ment of (preferably skilled) populations. Clearly, that is not very realistic. The policy-maker must
use endogenous market incentives for moving to larger cities, but little is known about these
incentives. Typically, although one can control for the endogeneity of density, the equation relating
people’s location choices to the characteristics of the region has not been estimated yet. This means
that the tools that could allow a policy-maker to attract more workers to larger regions have not
yet been characterised in a framework consistent with the estimation of agglomeration economies.
Furthermore, this should be done for each skill level separately if one wants to control the skills
composition of the region’s new immigrants. At one extreme, it might well be that people refuse
to move to large regions in any greater numbers than at present, and the policy-maker will fail to
increase the size of the region. At the other extreme, one can also reasonably imagine that people
are sensitive to housing and land prices, meaning that changing land use legislation could be an
effective way to influence the regional size. Again, the problem is that no quantification of the
migration determinants consistent with the agglomeration economies estimation is available.
Note that the estimation of agglomeration economies also implicitly assumes that the degree
of congestion of local infrastructure remains the same. For this to hold, land development would
have to take place simultaneously with the increase in regional density. Typically, local transport
infrastructure, schools, health services, etc. will have to be built. Obviously, such costs can be
covered by taxes on productivity gains (and are netted out of the above estimates of the density
impact), but the current empirical economic geography literature has very little to say about how
6
this can be implemented and the effort it represents. In other words, 2% is only a net gain,
corresponding to a x + 2% gross gain and a x% loss. Whether x is large or small, which has not yet
been assessed by the literature, can make some difference to the magnitude of the tax policy to be
implemented simultaneously with the local density increase.
In the same vein, it is worth stressing that the whole discussion in this section is only about
possible productivity gains from changes in the region’s characteristics. Unfortunately, given the
current state of the empirical literature, broader conclusions about the impact of regional size,
or any other local characteristics, on the total welfare of the economy cannot be proposed. This
requires the productivity gains and therefore income gains from agglomeration for the represent-
ative consumer to be weighed against the costs of agglomeration borne by the consumer, typically
the impact of the region’s characteristics on his cost of living. Very little is known empirically in
this area; there is for instance no consensual estimate for the elasticity of housing or land prices
to city size. Typically, if workers were mobile enough for their indirect utilities (income minus
the cost of living) to equalise across regions, the elasticity of productivity with respect to density
would also identify the impact of city size on the cost of living. There would be no welfare gain for
the representative consumer from increasing city size, even if productivity increased. However, as
presented in Combes, Duranton and Overman (2005) using a diagrammatic approach, this type of
conclusion relies on a number of crucial assumptions, regarding the inter-regional and intersectoral
mobility of workers, their possible differentiation in terms of skills, the magnitude of trade costs
for goods, the nature of competition, the way new cities can be built and so on. This prevents us
from providing a firm empirical answer to policymakers regarding the overall welfare effects of
city characteristics.
22.2 What are the optimal size and number of regions?
Given the log-linear form assumed for the positive impact of density on productivity, one single
region of the largest possible size would maximise the overall productivity of the economy.
However, this makes little sense in reality and has to be qualified from both the theoretical and
empirical perspectives. One of the conclusions of the theoretical literature on systems of cities
(from Henderson, 1974) states that, for each city, there exists a size that maximizes productivity
(and then an optimal number of cities in the economy, generally different from one). City size
increases productivity but at a decreasing marginal rate, a peak is reached and then productivity
declines with city size. The peak may depend on other characteristics of the city and therefore
be different for all of them. Estimating it over a cross-section of cities, or regions, can thus
prove to be difficult, and further complicated by endogeneity issues like those discussed in the
previous section. Beyond such problems, it is surprising that empirical specifications assume a
monotonously increasing effect of density, which prevents any inference about the fact that regions
are too large or too small with respect to the size that maximises productivity.
The study by Au and Henderson (2006), who focus on Chinese cities, is one of the rare ex-
ceptions that attempt at addressing these questions. China is an interesting case study, because
of the country’s rapid overall expansion and the presence of institutional constraints on internal
migration. Both in a structural setting, in the spirit of those described below, and in reduced-form
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specifications, Au and Henderson (2006) find that the impact of city size on output per worker
is indeed bell-shaped, implying the existence of a size for each city that maximises its output per
worker. They also show that it depends on the city characteristics, in particular its composition
in terms of manufacturing employment relative to services. The main conclusion reached, which
is striking, is that Chinese cities are in general too small to maximise productivity. Between 50
and 60% of the cities have a size significantly below the productivity peak, while only about
2% are significantly above. Among the cities that are too small, the median productivity loss is
modest, around 17%. However, it reaches 28% at the first quartile and at least 69% for 10% of
the cities. According to the authors, these undersized Chinese cities are explained by restrictions
on migration. Given the higher productivity they observe in cities, their intuition is that wages
there should be higher, and that this difference should not be fully offset by higher goods and
housing prices. Migration, if permitted by the authorities, should take place, thereby increasing
city size. However, a location choices equation to determine whether such mobility will take place
is not estimated, so this remains hypothetical. Moreover, even if such migration went in the right
direction, one should not forgot that the market outcome rarely corresponds to the social optimum
in economic geography. The question of how to reach this optimum, i.e. how to induce more
migration than obtained through market forces (if the market outcome is insufficient) remains.
A last issue concerns the impact on other regions of increasing the size of a region. In the absence
of foreign immigration or an increase in fertility rates, the growth of one region’s population can
only arise at the expense of other regions. If density, and therefore productivity, increase in one
region, they will both decrease elsewhere. This means that the optimal policy for a region may
be different from the optimal policy at the national level, a standard policy issue when studying
regional policies that is clearly present in this case.
Beyond the optimal size of each region, the question therefore arises of the optimal total number
of large regions. Although largely studied from the theoretical point of view, there is, to the best
of our knowledge, no empirical assessment of this issue. The difficulty lies in the fact that current
specifications do not involve much of the rest of the economy. The productivity of a region depends
on the characteristics of this region only and not on those of other regions (apart from the market
potential variable, which is further discussed below). A general equilibrium model of regional
trade would make all regions inter-dependent and should therefore be the starting point of the
analysis. Typically, an experiment such as increasing the density of a region would have not only
the direct, positive effect on its productivity we have just discussed but also indirect and possibly
negative effects on the productivity of other regions. It might then be possible to determine the
optimal spatial allocation of employment between regions. Still, we are clearly far from having a
setting allowing for all of this, and this makes it a possibly interesting future line of research.
The previous discussion focused on the role of density / overall size of the region. Similar
issues arise for most other explanatory variables considered in the reduced-form specifications.
Generally, the impact of own-industry size (specialisation) is positive. In France, it is around
0.02, meaning that increasing the share of an industry by 10%, increases productivity by 0.2%.
Specialisation elasticities can reach 0.04 in high-tech industries or business services. First, how can
a policy-maker increase the local share of a specific industry? To answer this question, one first
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needs to estimate the determinants of new firms’ location choices. A first step in this direction is
proposed by Combes, Magnac and Robin (2004), who estimate simultaneously (in a VAR model)
the determinants of the growth of existing firms and of the creation of new firms in a region. It
is typically obtained that some local characteristics that favour the latter may hinder the former.
However, this remains to be further investigated. Second, one cannot increase the share of all
industries at the same time within the same region. Moreover, as for density, it is probable that if
specialisation in a given industry increases in one region, it will decrease in others. The optimal
number of regions in the economy where a given industry is present is a question that this literature
does not answer.
Another issue specific to specialisation is its possible hysteresis effect. Some researchers hypo-
thesise that specialisation could have a positive impact on regional growth in periods where the
industry expands nationally, but a negative one when it contracts. In this case, the optimal policy
would depend on the period when it is applied, which can create time inconsistency. For example,
increasing specialisation may be efficient in the short-run but induce losses in the long-run.
Lastly, one could obtain estimates of the impact of density or specialisation specific to each
industry, which would enlarge the scope of policy recommendations, by making them specific
to each industry. The above 2% impact of density is an average over all industries, but we
can reasonably argue that it should depend on the industry, since they do not share the same
nature and magnitude of agglomeration and dispersion forces. Surprisingly, such industry-specific
estimates are rarely computed.
Hence, showing that local externalities on productivity exist within a framework that seriously
considers selection and endogeneity biases is a first crucial step that can be achieved with current
estimation techniques and data sets. However, directly deriving policy implications from current
results remains difficult, mainly because empirical strategies have not been designed with this
purpose in mind. We would reach similar conclusions with the literature on local employment
growth, which is further confused by interpretational issues.
22.3 Does trade integration improve productive efficiency?
In reduced-form approaches, the productivity of a region is explained by that region’s characterist-
ics. The external market potential is the only variable that takes into account the relative location of
the region within the economy. We will see below that this would be consistent with many recent
economic geography models, if more sophisticated versions of the market potential variable were
considered. Using Harris’ market potential, as this literature does, is clearly too crude. Evaluation
of the impact of trade integration on regional productivity in this context is necessarily incomplete,
although it should be at the heart of regional policies. Still, a few conclusions can be drawn.
The direct positive effect of market potential that is generally obtained implies that better
trade integration increases productivity. As for density, however, such a statement raises many
issues. Possible selection and endogeneity biases on market potential are exactly the same as those
described for density. Typically, the measure of productivity has to net out the effect of the local
labour composition in terms of skills. Then, both firms and employees being attracted by high
market potential regions (as they are by density), the causality may be reversed. Both issues can
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be addressed using the same tools (panel data and historical or geological instruments) as for
density. For France, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon and Roux (2009) found the typical elasticity of
productivity with respect to market potential once these biases are controlled to be very similar to
the eleasticity for density, at around 0.02-0.03.
The question then arises of how to increase market potential in a region. There are only two
possibilities. The first consists in increasing the size / density of nearby regions. Since market
potential and density elasticities are about the same, the productivity increase for the region is
the same whether density increases in that same region or in all the other regions by the same
amount. Beyond the fact that the former strategy seems to be easier to implement, increasing
market potential by changing regional densities is plagued by the same problems as changing
own-region density. As long as the determinants of households’ and firms’ location choices are
not characterised simultaneously with the estimate of agglomeration economies, it is difficult
to determine which tools the policymaker can use to change the density of neighbouring areas.
Moreover, beyond productivity gains in a given region, the policymaker would also have to assess
the overall effect of his strategy, i.e. its impact on other regions. Typically, increasing market
potential in one region can entail decreasing it in other regions, those from which the population
comes. However, if one could succeed in increasing density in all regions simultaneously, typically
by means of foreign immigration, all regions would benefit from both the own-density and the
market potential effects.
There is a second way of increasing market potential, however. It consists in reducing trade
costs. Many components enter trade costs, typically transport costs, information costs and trade
policies. We can imagine a policymaker having some means to affect transport costs, typically by
building transport infrastructure. First, the cost of building this infrastructure is not captured by
the reduced-form approach, and should be deduced from possible gains. Second, some elements
of transport costs, like the cost of energy, are only partly under the control of the policymaker.
He can control the corresponding taxes, but not the raw energy price. An increase in transport
costs in the future can be envisioned if the cost of energy increases a lot. The policymaker can
also play on information costs, but there are very few estimates of the share of these costs in total
trade costs. If one believes the few estimates of the effect of migration on trade, for instance (see
Rauch, 2001, Wagner, Head and Ries, 2002, and Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer, 2005), it could
be quite large, but this remains to be confirmed. Lastly, the policymaker can use trade policy
tools, but he is clearly constrained by the political economy of such changes, both domestically
and internationally. In any case, it would affect only the part of market potential that is external to
the country, which is not always included in regressions.
One important issue when playing on trade costs is that this affects the location incentives of
all agents, by changing the extent of competition, the prices of goods and the returns to factors.
However, the impact of market potential is evaluated ceteris paribus, which is rarely the case in
practice. Typically, both own- and other regions’ densities change simultaneously with the fall in
trade costs. Unfortunately, the magnitude of such indirect effects is not known, since, once again,
no equation exists to specify how people and firms choose their location. Again, this calls for a
multi-equation empirical approach dealing with both location decisions and regional productivity.
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Inter-regional trade costs being rare in data sets, a further issue relates to the fact that distance
alone is often used to proxy them. Combes and Lafourcade (2005) show that this is a fairly relevant
strategy in cross-section. Still, it may only imperfectly tackle information costs, as shown by
Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005), and trade policy costs. Moreover, it is useless to capture
the inter-temporal variations of trade costs. While more sophisticated strategies to estimate trade
costs have been considered in the structural approaches we present in section 3, this is not the
case for reduced-form approaches. Therefore, the strict interpretation of an increase in market
potential when regional densities are held constant is a reduction in distance, which is, strictly
speaking, impossible. Moreover, the Harris’ market potential used here assumes that the elasticity
of trade costs with respect to distance is equal to one, while the empirical trade literature estimates
a different value for the overall impact of distance on trade costs (see Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004), depending also on the particular component of trade costs (transport, information, trade
policy) one wants to assess. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the amount by which one has to
change distance to match a given trade costs variation when the Harris specification is used.
To conclude, it is important to note that a direct consequence of the reduced-form estimation of
the impact of market potential on productivity is that the optimal policy is to reduce trade costs
as much as possible, which increases productivity everywhere. As for the conclusion that a single
large region would be optimal, this shows that the model is incomplete. As noted above, there
are two main concerns. The cost of reducing trade costs is ignored, and it can be large. More
importantly, changing trade costs affects all the other variables in the economy and, in particular,
the location choices of both households and firms, which is not taken into account. The assessment
of the impact of trade costs in this framework is therefore partial. We will see in section 3 that
structural approaches should prove to be more consistent in this respect.
22.4 Do regional subsidies affect local development?
Older strategies for assessing the role of transport infrastructure consider it as an input of the
regional production function. In one of the first empirical studies of endogenous growth theory,
Barro (1990) for instance proposes extra explanatory variables for government spending, among
which transport can be distinguished. Such a strategy rapidly reaches a dead-end, however. The
most important limit is again due to the fact that it implicitly considers that agents are immobile
and do not update their location choices when infrastructure changes. More than that, since
transport infrastructure clearly affects the region’s trading opportunities, it modifies the region’s
specialisation pattern and the profitability of firms on which productivity, as defined above, de-
pends. Moreover, since government spending in a region changes trade costs with all the other
regions, it also affects productivity in those regions. This is not taken into consideration, since
the region’s productivity is assumed to depend only on its own infrastructure. In this respect,
considering the role of infrastructure through its impact on a market potential variable would
be more consistent, but this approach is ignored in this literature. Lastly, infrastructure is very
often built either in expanding regions (to limit congestion of the local transport network), or,
on the contrary, in depressed regions (to help them catch up). In either case, this raises reverse
causality issues, since regional productivity is now a determinant of government spending. This
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reverse causality is rarely addressed (one reason being the difficulty of finding good instruments),
Duranton and Turner (2010) being a recent exception.
In addition to the role of local government spending, there are, in many European countries,
specific regional policies. Typically, subsidies are given to firms that choose to locate in certain
regions, for instance to cover part of their installation costs. They can also benefit from tax
exemption. Again, assessing the impact of such local policies is difficult due to the fact that
they are targeted to the regions that have the lowest productivity. This is very similar to the
famous example of the positive correlation between the local number of police employees and
the local level of crime, due to the fact that extra police are targeted to high-crime areas. For
regional policies, not controlling for such a reverse causality could very well lead to an erroneous
conclusion that subsidies have a negative effect on productivity Among recent studies, Dallérba
and Le Gallo (2008) evaluate the impact of European structural funds on the convergence process
between European regions over 1989-1999, controlling for potential endogeneity. They show
that although there is indeed convergence between regions, regional funds have no impact on
it. Moreover, investments targeted to peripheral regions do not spill over to their neighbours.
Also circumventing endogeneity, Martin, Mayer and Maynéris (2008) show that regional policy
in France has little if any impact on local employment and productivity. Studying the "Regional
Selective Assistance" (RSA) programme in the UK, Devereux, Griffith, and Simpson (2007) show
that grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific areas. Interestingly, they also find
that regional policy is complementary (and not a substitute) to agglomeration economies, in the
sense that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing
plants in their industry. Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Van Reenen (2007) use an instrumental
variable approach and find that the RSA has a positive effect on both employment and investment,
which naïve estimators underestimate, but there is no statistically significant effect on total factor
productivity. The RSA, by supporting less efficient firms, slows down reallocation to more efficient
plants. Using a regression-discontinuity to identify the causal effects of Objective 1 treatment
on the economic growth of EU regions, Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich (2010) find positive per
capita GDP growth effects, but no employment growth effects. Overall, the estimation strategy
used in reduced-form approaches may not be the most relevant for testing the impact of regional
policies, for the reasons developed above, and it could be improved by using the more structural
approaches presented in section 3. Nevertheless, there is currently, to say the least, no strong
evidence regarding the impact of regional subsidies on local development.
3. Structural approaches and the spatial efficiency-equity trade-off
We have underlined that the way trade costs enter reduced-form specifications is crude. Typically,
transport infrastructure for instance is seen either as an input of the regional production function,
or, at best, as a determinant of the Harris market potential. An important contribution of new
economic geography models is to stress that, in general equilibrium, trade costs affect most endo-
genous variables, quantity, prices but also factor returns and endowments. Therefore, in empirical
exercises, almost all explanatory variables depend on them, bringing into play numerous direct
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and indirect effects that cannot be disentangled without a more precise theoretical background to
underpin the empirical specification. For this reason, an empirical literature has been designed
to take theory even more seriously and to use it to derive specifications directly obtained from
theoretical models. This should allow the researchers to consider all channels through which
economic policy variables, including trade costs, affect regional disparities.
This section follows the same organisational pattern as section 2. We first clarify the theoretical
background used and the empirical specifications derived from it. While most of the empirical
difficulties underlined in section 2 remain, new ones also appear. Still, we show that some policy
implications can be obtained, and also that empirical strategies more specifically designed to
address policy issues would be welcome.
31 Theoretical background and estimation strategies
Typical models used to make structural estimations are borrowed from the Dixit and Stiglitz
economic geography approaches, more precisely the Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables
(1995) settings. The first step consists in extending these models to frameworks encompassing a
large number of regions and industries. Manufacturing goods are differentiated into varieties and
consumers have CES preferences over these varieties. In addition to labour as an input, the pro-
duction function may include a CES composite input made of the manufacturing varieties. Trade
costs are of the Samuelson-Iceberg type, entering demand functions multiplicatively. Monopolistic
price competition with free entry takes place between firms.
Two main structural empirical strategies have been envisioned. The first, proposed by Hanson
(2005), is probably more relevant for small, within-country, geographical scales. Agglomeration
mechanisms are based on labour migration, people being perfectly mobile across locations. The
Redding and Venables (2004) approach can deal with situations where labour spatial mobility is
low (it assumes no inter-regional mobility) and emphasises the role of intermediate inputs. In
both cases, it is shown that wages, and therefore local labour productivity, are functions of market
potential. However, this market potential, while close in its spirit to Harris’ market potential,
encompasses more sophisticated effects. Generally speaking, market potential corresponds to the
intuition that, if a firm is located in or near a large region, it can access a larger market than if it
is located in a small region. This is because trade costs make firms less efficient than local firms
on distant markets. Firms have higher market shares on nearby markets and therefore sell more
when these are large. In other words, the size of the firm’s market corresponds to a spatially
discounted sum of all market sizes (in terms of population or employment), which is what Harris’
market potential emphasises. Now, in a fully-fledged model under imperfect competition, one
understands easily that the magnitude of the market share loss on distant markets due to trade
costs depends on the degree of asymmetry between markets in terms of both the number of firms
and the demand for variety, which are endogenous in the model. In equilibrium, the firm’s total
sales depend not only on the spatially discounted market size but also on price effects reflecting
the extent of competition on each market. Typically, in such settings, productivity is shown to be
a function of what researchers call the real market potential, a Harris market potential corrected
by price effects. It depends on price indexes in all locations, which are CES functions of variety
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prices. The main problem for the econometrician consists in dealing with these price indexes. On
top of being endogenous, they are highly non-linear in unknown parameters, which make them
typically not available in data sets.
Hanson (2005) tackles this issue with the help of Non-Linear Least Squares (NLLS). However,
he needs to consider the Helpman (1998) extension of the Krugman (1991) model that considers
the role of local housing markets, which allows him to escape the non-realistic equilibrium where
industry completely disappears from some regions. Migration decisions depend not only on nom-
inal income and variety price indexes but also on housing prices. Using the fact that under perfect
mobility, indirect utilities equalise across locations, and considering all other markets clearing
conditions, the price indexes can be replaced in the real market potential variable by observed
variables, which leads to a specification such as:
log wr = a + α1 log
[
∑
s
Yα2s w
α3
s H
α4
s e
−δdrs
]
+ εr (4)
where wr is the wage in region r, a is a constant term, and Ys and Hs are the total income and hous-
ing stocks in region s, respectively. e−δdrs , where drs is the distance between r and s, is the spatial
discount factor. Hence, if we ignore the role of ws and Hs, the explanatory variable consists in a
Harris market potential2. The structural model shows that price effects in a fully-fledged economic
geography model modify the specification and make it necessary to include other variables in the
market potential function.
The approach is structural because the specification estimated is directly derived from the
theoretical model and because estimated parameters (δ and the αi for i = 1 to 4) can be related
to the theoretical model’s parameters (the elasticity of substitution between varieties, the share of
manufacturing in consumption, and trade costs) for which estimates are therefore also obtained.
The first econometric issue relates to the non-linearity of specification (4) with respect to the
parameters to be estimated. Hanson (2005) deals with that using NLLS. Then, given that the
structural approach reduces to estimating a wage equation with local characteristics as explanatory
variables, the same issues regarding missing variables and reverse causality as those described
in section 2 are present. They are tackled using the same tools (control variables, region and
industry fixed-effects, instrumentation). The main conclusion is that such a model is not rejected
for US counties (Hanson, 2005), for Germany (Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2004) or for
Italy (Mion, 2004), in the sense that estimates are structurally consistent. They match theoretical
constraints (for instance the elasticity of substitution between varieties has to be larger than one)
and are close to the values generally admitted. It is also shown that the share of the spatial wage
variance explained by such a specification is fairly large and that the real market potential performs
at least as well as, and often better than Harris’ market potential.
There are certain limits to this approach, including, from the policy point of view, the fact that
theoretical predictions of such a large scale (with more than two regions) model are not known.
Moreover, the model only considers one differentiated good sector. Therefore the empirical ap-
2Except that Harris uses an inverse instead of an exponential function of distance.
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plication deals with wages aggregated over all industries, making it impossible to obtain industry
specific estimates or, consequently, industry-specific policy recommendations.
The Redding and Venables’ (2004) approach is also structural but it emphasises different ag-
glomeration and dispersion forces. In their model, the wage equation reduces to
log wr = a +
1
ασ
log RMPr +
γ
α(σ− 1) log SPr −
β
α
log xr − 1
σ
log (a/c) + εr (5)
where RMPr is the same real market potential variable as in Hanson (2005). xr corresponds to the
price of inputs other than labour, a variable which is also implicitly present in Hanson (2005). In
both cases, it is assessed by control variables. Finally, SPr is a new effect that also takes the form
of a real market potential variable. It assesses the access to intermediate input markets, which
depends on the location of input suppliers instead of final consumers. To tackle the estimation
problems that real market potential variables create, in particular their non-linearity in unknown
parameters, Redding and Venables (2004) design a strategy that uses information on trade flows.
According to the model, the two market potential variables can be written as:
RMPr =∑
s
exp(FMs)φrs and SPr =∑
s
exp(FXs)φsr (6)
where φrs is a function of trade costs τrs and FMs and FXs are the same regional fixed effects that
enter a trade equation also derived from the model:
log Xrs = FXr + log τrs + FMs + νrs
The trade equation, which is not very data-demanding, is estimated first. It only requires the spe-
cification of trade costs as a function of distance, and also possibly as a function of other variables,
some of them directly related to policies. Then, the estimates for the origin and destination fixed
effects, FXr and FMs, are plugged back in (6) to get predictions of RMPr and SPr. These are finally
used to estimate specification (5) with OLS.
Given the assumption of absence of spatial labour mobility and the importance attached to
access to intermediate inputs, this model is relevant to explain disparities at high spatial levels,
typically between countries. Unfortunately, wage data are not available for a large set of countries
or large regions. Therefore, Redding and Venables (2004) use GDP per capita as the dependent
variable. They show that when the market potential variables are introduced into the specification
alone, they both have a positive and significant effect on GDP per capita. They also explain more
than 70% of the GDP per capita variance. Estimations are shown to be fairly sensitive to the choice
of the internal distance used to assess the own-market size of the country. Typically, if the weight
given to this market (corresponding to an ad hoc choice) is too high, one ends up explaining GDP
per capita by GDP. This also demonstrates again that both of the real market potential variables
are probably endogenous. Redding and Venables (2004) consider two main strategies to tackle
this issue. The first one, more distant to theory, consists in removing the own country from the
market potential variable. The share of the variance explained by such real market potential
external to the country is still equal to 35%. This also makes Canada for instance richer than the
US, which, from both the reality and policy points of view, is not very appealing. The second
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strategy uses the distances to New York, Brussels and Tokyo, which, maybe surprisingly due
to their obvious correlation with current productivity shocks, pass over-identification tests. Like
Hanson (2005), similar results are obtained when many control variables are introduced (Redding
and Venables deal with primary resources, geography, institutions but not education as Hanson
(2005) does). The main problem that Redding and Venables (2004) face is that, unfortunately, the
real market potential variables are never simultaneously significant, which would correspond to
the structural model. This is probably due to the too-high correlation of the two market potential
variables. Strictly speaking, it prevents one from deciding whether or not to reject the model using
structural parameters, which cannot be recovered. After the first application to disparities between
countries at the world level by Redding and Venables (2005), this strategy (but without the role
of intermediate inputs) has been applied to various areas to explain European regional GDP per
capita (Breinlich, 2006) and wages (Head and Mayer, 2006), wages in Indonesian districts (Amiti
and Cameron, 2007) and Chinese cities (Hering and Poncet, 2010). Lastly, like Hanson (2005), the
study is performed on aggregate data, making it impossible to provide industry-specific policy
implications.3
32 Policy implications
32.1 Does the Bell-shaped curve hold?
One of the main results of recent economic geography models is the presence of a bell-shaped
relationship between trade costs and spatial disparities. Typically, trade integration first increases
spatial concentration and disparities, due to agglomeration forces that develop more strongly than
dispersion forces. At further stages of integration, the reverse holds, as dispersion forces now
strengthen faster. A typical pattern for disparities in regional indirect utilities of a two-region
economy is represented in figure 1.
Economies that are very badly integrated do not present regional disparities. This corresponds
to the right-hand side of Figure 1, where, for high trade costs, the indirect utilities VA and VB of two
regions A and B are identical. Increasing trade integration first increases welfare homogeneously
over space. In other words, efficiency is improved while perfect regional equity is maintained.
However, further economic integration causes spatial differentiation, which implies a divergence
between regions. In the core region (A in Figure 1) where manufacturing concentrates, a better
accessibility to varieties, and possibly higher nominal wages, makes indirect utility higher than for
lower integration levels, while the reverse holds in the peripheral region (B). In general, whereas
efficiency keeps increasing for the average consumer, immobile workers located in the periphery
lose, while immobile workers located in the core gain. This is also the case for mobile workers. This
3See Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008) for more details.
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Figure 1: Trade costs and regional disparities
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pattern corresponds to the famous spatial efficiency-equity trade-off.4 Trade integration increases
efficiency but also creates disparities. For high levels of trade integration, however, convergence
occurs, with some firms relocating to the periphery, due to too high a degree of congestion in
the core (competition on goods markets, high land prices and labour costs, congested transport
networks, degradation of the environment, etc.). This reduces regional differentials in both access
to varieties and nominal wages. The indirect utility spatial gap of immobile workers decreases,
and eventually disappears, while the average consumer keeps gaining. Efficiency and equity
objectives are reconciled during this phase. While based on numerous technical assumptions
(regarding the nature of competition, the formulation of trade costs, the mobility of workers,
etc.), this spatial pattern of regional disparities in two-region settings is considered to be a robust
theoretical conclusion of economic geography models.
It is tempting to conclude that when structural estimation fails to reject economic geography
models, they also fail to reject the bell-shaped pattern for regional disparities. One consequence is
that trade integration is always good, for all agents if very deep integration can be achieved, at least
on average otherwise. Even in the latter case, it can be shown that compensation schemes can be
implemented to make everybody better off. This means that in general the gains from integration
can be redistributed to the agents that it harms
These are fairly optimistic conclusions, but they are qualified by further thoughts about these
issues. First, neither theoretical models nor their structural estimations are precise about which
4See Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud (2002, chap. 11) for one of the first systematic analysis
of the efficiency-equity pattern. The literature has then proven that the conclusions reached could depend on the
welfare function considered (See for instance Ottaviano and Thisse 2002; Charlot, Gaigné, Robert-Nicoud, Thisse 2005).
Moreover, when the agglomeration mechanism entails factor accumulation or input-ouput linkages, immobile factor
owners may gain and mobile factors may lose from agglomeration (see Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud 2006; Gaigné
2006)). However, as clear from the rest of this section, the empirical literature is for the moment far from being able to
empirically assess which of these sometimes conflicting conclusions are the most relevant for reality.
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tax system should be introduced simultaneously with trade integration to achieve both efficiency
and equity objectives. In particular, the above-mentioned compensation strategy is possible using
lump-sum transfers. However, they are difficult to implement in reality, for instance due to the
presence of asymmetric or imperfect information. This requires the use of second-best incentive-
compatible contracts, which can induce efficiency losses. Moreover, nothing is said about the
amounts that should be transferred between agents or the levels of tax that should be levied.
Given that the perfect integration / zero trade costs situation cannot be achieved, there exists an
optimal level of trade integration that does not necessarily correspond to the lowest level of trade
costs. Again, it is characterised neither in models nor in their structural estimation. Typically,
and on top of the nature of the welfare function used (Benthamian, Rawlsian, or other), this
optimal level depends on two parameters that are very difficult to assess and can be specific
to each economy: the weighting given to the different agents in the economy and the degree of
inequity aversion. To summarise, a policy that consists in reducing trade costs has consequences
other than average regional efficiency and must therefore be completed by other policies, typically
redistributive fiscal ones. But the optimal taxation exercise in the spatial economy context faces
the standard difficulties that usually characterise it and has rarely been properly and completely
characterised.
The policy-maker wishing to implement spatial policies faces two further big issues. The first,
implicit in the previous discussion, is that the optimal policy may crucially depend on where the
economy is on the bell-shaped curve. The second is that it has never been fully proved that the two-
region bell-shaped curve presented in figure 1 holds in the context of a large number of regions.
Regarding the first issue, if the economy is already in a situation of low trade costs where both
efficiency and equity objectives are compatible, the optimal policy is clearly to further decrease
trade costs. However, for higher trade costs, when the efficiency-equity trade-off holds, very
inequity-averse societies would probably prefer to increase trade costs. Indeed, even when it is
possible to maintain the standard of living of immobile agents when trade integration occurs (by
using lump-sum transfers), some degree of disparity remains. It is therefore crucial, from the
empirical point of view, to assess where an economy lies on its bell-shaped curve before being able
to assess whether further trade integration is good or not.
Now we come to the second point. Given that an economy rarely consists of only two regions,
one first needs to determine how the bell-shaped curve can be extended to a context of numerous
regions. Extending the model to a large number of regions is fairly easy even with trade costs
that are origin-, destination- and industry-specific, as they are in the real world. What proves
difficult, and this should not come as a surprise given the difficulties already encountered in two-
region settings, is the characterisation of the number and nature of equilibria that exist. The only
possible strategy consists in appealing to simulation-based approaches, which is described in the
next section.
32.2 Where are we on the bell-shaped curve?
Forslid, Haaland and Midelfart-Knarvik (2002) seek to evaluate the properties of an economic
geography model calibrated for European regions and countries and, in particular, whether a
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bell-shaped pattern exists for regional disparities when trade costs decline. They also seek to
take into account real features absent from economic geography models and they consider, among
other things, the role of traditional comparative advantage effects. The economy consists of ten
large regions5 zero trade costs. Two other sectors (public and private services) correspond to non-
tradable goods also produced under diminishing returns to scale. Finally, ten sectors operate under
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz assumptions, with origin-, destination- and sector-specific trade costs.
These sectors use primary factors (unskilled labour, skilled labour, capital) immobile between
regions but mobile between sectors and the production functions are nested Cobb-Douglas and
CES functions, with full input-output matrixes and region-specific technology. Lastly, consumer
preferences also correspond to nested Cobb-Douglas and CES functions with sector- and region-
specific consumption shares. Forslid, Haaland and Midelfart-Knarvik (2002) calibrate all the model
parameters using national accounting data as well as other academic studies for the elasticities of
substitution and trade costs. They first provide a set of simulations relating trade costs to the
degree of spatial concentration in each industry.
A bell-shaped curve is observed in four sectors: those where increasing returns to scale are
large. Comparative advantage effects dominate in the four others, which implies a monotonous
increase in spatial concentration with trade costs. Spatial concentration variations are weaker
for the former, suggesting that trade integration induces more spatial reallocation in traditional
industries. Importantly, Forslid, Haaland and Midelfart-Knarvik (2002) conclude that most sectors
with increasing returns to scale are to the right-hand side of the peak of their bell-shaped curve,
i.e. in the area where reducing trade costs would further increase spatial concentration. This is
also the case for manufacturing as a whole, with a peak of spatial concentration reached for trade
costs 30% lower than their current value.
Lastly, Forslid, Haaland and Midelfart-Knarvik (2002) also assess the impact of trade integration
on factor returns. The conclusion is that, consistently with economic geography models, factors do
not experience the same variations in their real returns with respect to trade integration, and this
depends on the region. In particular, real returns may either increase or decrease, or be either bell-
or U-shaped when trade integration improves. Variations are small and no large gain emerges from
trade integration. Therefore, such a simulated approach using a large-scale economic geography
model really provides further insights for policy-makers thinking about a possible decrease in
trade costs. Gains and losses of the various agents are well identified in a framework that considers
many direct and indirect effects.
A number of concerns are specific to this study, while others are more general. Taking theory
seriously implies that the results obtained are valid only under the assumptions made. It is very
difficult to assess the extent to which results depend on the technical assumptions made regarding
functional forms for utilities or production functions, the number of sectors or inputs and even
the spatial concentration index chosen to evaluate the degree of spatial disparity. As always with
simulation, the only solution consists in repeating the exercise using different sets of assumptions.
5Four Western Europe areas (Central, North, South, and West), US and Canada, Southeast Asia (incl. Japan), China
and South Asia, former Soviet countries, Eastern Europe, the rest of the world) Two sectors (agriculture and energy) use
labour as the single input with diminishing returns to scale and have
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Importantly for the study of spatial policies, Forslid, Haaland and Midelfart-Knarvik (2002) as-
sume, like Redding and Venables (2004), that no spatial labour migration takes place between
countries. As discussed in section 2, this clearly eliminates some channels of regional disparity,
especially those self-reinforcing due to the endogenous size of regional population characteristic of
the Krugman (1991) type economic geography models. Although many more general equilibrium
effects are considered here by comparison to the reduced-form approaches presented in section 2,
in particular the role of endogenous demand and intermediate input prices, evaluation of the
impact of trade cost reduction is still somewhat ceteris paribus, at least as regards households’
location choices. This should be extended.
If a more structural approach allows researchers to be more precise about the welfare impact of
trade integration, the cost of reducing trade costs still needs to be weighed against possible welfare
gains. But these costs are difficult to assess and the question of the time horizon over which they
have to be written off arises. The tools that can be used to reduce trade costs and the magnitude
of the possible decrease given the current level of technology are related questions that we have
already addressed in section 2. In other words, whether it is possible to reach the peaks of some
of the bell-shaped curves obtained by Forslid, Haaland and Midelfart-Knarvik (2002), which are
typically 30% below current levels, remains an open question. Assumptions about trade costs may
largely limit possible inference about that, as explained in section 2when, for instance, they depend
on distance only. The Redding and Venables (2004) approach, which considers components other
than distance in the trade equation and which could be extended, is certainly more appropriate for
distinguishing the role of trade policy and of reduced transport costs for instance.
We mentioned earlier that dealing simultaneously with efficiency and equity concerns prob-
ably requires the introduction of a fiscal policy concurrently with trade integration. Clearly, a
calibrated economic geography model could allow for that. It would tell us whether it is possible
to compensate those who lose from trade integration by redistributing from those who gain. It
would probably be possible to go even one step further and include a second-best taxation block
in the model. Simulating its properties when trade costs decrease would provide further insights
for policy-makers, at least under the modelling assumptions made.
Playing with simulated economic geography models certainly opens many interesting avenues
for the study of regional policies. The fact that the underlying model has not been tested remains
an important limit, however. Structural approaches, like those by Hanson (2005) and Redding and
Venables (2004) described above, could however be used as preliminary steps in simulations. First,
structural estimations could provide the values of certain parameters needed for the simulations.
They could be estimated in a context fully consistent with the simulated one and not borrowed
from other studies sometimes quite far-removed from the chosen framework. Second, and as
stressed above, the simulated model could be tested before policy experiments are conducted,
and it could at least be shown that it is not rejected by the data used. Therefore, we believe that
simulating economic geography models that are structurally estimated is probably a promising
line of research for studying the impact of regional policies, including trade integration. This
objective has not yet been achieved. For instance, the Redding and Venables (2004) strategy may
not be directly appropriate for that. The use of fixed effects in the trade equation estimation limits
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the simulation exercise since, by definition, fixed-effects, which proxy for market size, do not to
change when trade costs decrease. Still, it is certainly possible to use similar settings that would
allow a policy-maker to address regional disparity issues, taking into account many direct and
indirect effects of his/her decisions.
32.3 Further regional policy issues
One advantage of structural approaches consists in their precision in the assumptions made and,
therefore, in the clear interpretation that can be given to results. The drawback, when one wants
to assess the impact of policies for the real world, might be that too many effects are neglected.
In a way, the reduced-form estimate of the impact of density is not very sophisticated. It is only
a total net effect, but one advantage is that it encompasses quite a wide range of agglomeration
and dispersion effects. For instance, Hanson (2005) considers the role of crowding in the housing
market, but Redding and Venables (2004) do not. Is it relevant to assess the role of a policy without
considering that the spatial gradients of land price are usually large and do impact on households’
and firms’ location choices? Similarly, the congestion of transport networks is ignored in structural
approaches, even if a direct effect of trade integration could be to increase trade flows, which would
induce congestion
Another concern that should gain importance in the near future for policy-makers relates to en-
vironmental considerations. By affecting firms’ and households’ location choices and the volume
traded between locations, regional policies have an impact on CO2 emissions, for instance, and
on environmental concerns in general. If one considers polluting emissions as a cost for future
generations through their possible impact on climate and health, they should be included in the
policy-maker’s objective function. This would change the optimal policy. The direction of the
change is not straightforward, however. For instance, more agglomeration may imply less trade,
which saves emissions, but we have seen that low enough trade costs may induce re-dispersion.
Furthermore, one must take into account the movements of both goods and people, while models
encompassing both inter-regional trade and local commuting are rare. The environmental impact
of location choices may also depend on which sectors relocate. All of this clearly makes this line of
research appealing.
Some positive effects, such as pure externalities due to knowledge spill-overs or improved
matching on local labour markets, are also absent from current structural models. As long as
they are used in a theoretical perspective, i.e. to better understand the various forces at work,
and possibly, once calibrated, to determine the most likely equilibrium, these limits might not be
a problem. But if the purpose is to provide a quantified answer for a policy-maker, the scope of
agglomeration and dispersion effects considered in the model should definitely be extended. This
is clearly feasible in fully calibrated models, but probably more difficult if one wants to obtain
some of the parameters from a structural estimation.
Other costs that should not be ignored in a real context relate to the imperfect mobility of factors
between sectors. Assuming that factors can be reallocated perfectly between sectors is standard.
But this is clearly not satisfied in reality. Some costs of setting-up plants are sunk, technology and
labour skills are partly specific to sectors, if not to firms, and cannot be transferred to other activ-
21
ities. All of this should be deducted from possible gains from the policy. There are two problems,
however. The first is that mobility, be it spatial or sectoral, is in reality imperfect, whereas models
assume either perfect mobility or none. This means that there is a further dimension to estimate,
which is the share of the activity that is mobile. The difficulty is that this is an endogenous variable,
since it depends on the degree of asymmetry between regions or sectors. The second problem
relates to the fact that some of the costs of moving between regions or sectors are non-monetary.
They can be purely psychological, or relate to the loss of social networks for instance. These
dimensions should not be ignored by policy-makers, but are certainly pretty difficult to assess
and quantify.
4. Conclusions
The conclusion of this survey could appear to be pretty pessimistic. In the end, we know little and
so many dimensions are ignored from current analysis that little advice can be given to policy-
makers. But the glass is also half-full.
Using both reduced-form and structural approaches, the spectrum of the policy recommenda-
tions that can be given is quite large. Reduced-form approaches allow the researchers to consider
many variables that impact on regional disparities, as long as they are careful about interpretation
and endogeneity issues. Even if one is not always able to identify separately all the mechanisms
at work, the overall impact of these variables can be estimated. The conclusion that agglomeration
economies exist and that larger regions would make people and firms more efficient cannot de
denied, even if some questions still remain to be answered, such as how to reach this goal, whether
it creates extra costs not considered in the analysis, or what is the optimal number of cities in an
economy. The advantages of structural approaches are the opposite. Many less issues can be
simultaneously addressed, but one can be more precise about which intuitions are considered and
about the underlying mechanisms and effects at work. Structural approaches make the simulation
of policy scenarios possible. Generalising strategies that mix structural estimation and simulation
should enlarge the scope of the policy concerns addressed by this literature. For instance, one could
imagine including the role of imperfect mobility (between sectors and locations) or addressing
certain environmental concerns, for instance.
Clearly, even approaches that are now standard have not been reproduced for a large set of
countries and geographical levels. It would probably be useful to compare the estimates obtained,
and their policy implications, between different geographical and institutional contexts. Economic
geography studies on India, Asian, Latin American or African countries remain rather scarce,
while the diversity of the economical context there would probably make the study of regional
policies particularly interesting.
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